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CURTIS CARTER 
ARTS AND COGNITION: PERFORMANCE, CRITICISM 
AND AESTHETICS 
Evidence continues to mount for the proposition that the arts are cogni-
tive symbols in important respects. Through the substantial efforts of 
Susanne Langer, Rudolf Arnheim, Nelson Goodman, and others, current 
views on the nature of thinking, the variety and functions of cognitive 
symbols, and the range of cognitive activities have broadened consider-
ably. Langer, for instance, represents the arts as symbols capable of 
providing a unique knowledge of human feeling.1 Arnheim has pion-
eered in showing that visual images, as well as kinesthetic and other 
nonverbal sensory images of the kinds characteristically found in the 
arts, are effective means to carry out thinking.2 Goodman has proposed 
that the range of human symbols with cognitive significance extends to 
all of the arts.3 The objections of positivists and others who argued that 
the term "cognitive significance" applies only to propositions formulated 
in a language with a well-determined structure, and with the capability 
for empirical verification, will no doubt continue to interest some cogni-
tive theorists, causing them to question whether the arts are really cogni-
tive in nature. The debate over whether symbol systems in the arts are 
languages or language-like is but one aspect of the ongoing discussion 
of cognition in the arts. For myself, however, the evidence of recent 
studies in philosophy and cognitive psychology in favor of a cognitive 
view of the arts is more persuasive.4 
This paper directs inquiry into the cognitive aspects of art to a 
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distinction between performance and responses to performances. Per-
formances and responses to them, such as criticism and aesthetic 
theory, represent important modes of arts-related cognition. The discus-
sion here will be limited to the cognitive aspects of dance performances 
and to responses in the form of criticism and aesthetic theory. 
The distinction between performances and responses draws atten-
tion to two different aspects of knowledge as reflected in the German 
words, erlebnis and erkenntnis. Erlebnis, which is sometimes referred to 
as knowledge by acquaintance, is knowledge attained in the presence 
of an object or event. Erlebnis is not a vague or contentless gesture at 
the ineffable. Erlebnis is an ordered, intelligible symbolic process 
through which the producer sends out information and is also the 
receiver of information about the process itself and the meaning of its 
symbols. 
Erkenntnis is knowledge about something and consists of description 
and interpretation of an object or event. It is based on observation and 
reasoning processes such as association, comparison, appeal to prior 
knowledge, and judgment. Knowledge in the form of erkenntnis can, 
under certain circumstances, act as a "mental" substitute for the object 
or event. 
In the case of art,however, a description or an interpretation seldom, 
if ever amounts to an exhaustive characterization of the work. It is neces-
sary to supplement erkenntnis with erlebnis which is supplied by the 
seeing, hearing, or undergoing, as in the case of performing, in the 
actual presence of the artwork. Hence both erkenntnis and erlebnis have 
a major place in the study of the arts. My intent is not, therefore, to pro-
pose that erkenntnis and erlebnis constitute a dualism of knowledge 
with respect to the arts. There are in fact elements of both at work in a 
dance performance and in the responses to it. The dancer brings to per-
formance a substantial knowledge about dance (erkenntnis), including a 
system of formalized training, and at the same time, she/he discovers 
and discloses to the audience an individualized presence that can only 
be experienced at a particular moment of performance (erlebnis). A 
critic, responding to the performance receives initial impressions of the 
performance in the moment of performance, as erlebnis, but criticism 
itself consists of a mixture of initial impressions with analysis, description 
and interpretation resulting in erkenntnis. 
In view of the fact that John Hospers once appealed to the very same 
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distinction between erlebnis and erkenntnis to deny that art works can 
provide knowledge of any sort, a brief explanation of our differences is 
required. Following Morritz Schlick, Hospers argues that erkenntnis, but 
not erlebnis is a form of knowledge. Hence, works of art provide only 
immediate expressive experiences lacking in cognitive significance.s 
Since no substantial reasons are given for excluding erlebnis from 
knowledge, other than to say that knowledge is about things, while 
acquaintance is immediate, Hospers' conclusion seems arbitrary and 
without justification. On the other hand, it is entirely within the historic 
and philosophic meanings of the terms "knowledge" and "cognition" to 
include both erlebnis and erkenntnis as forms or knowledge or cogni-
tion. For this reason, and because the recognition of both forms of 
knowledge will constitute an important step toward ending the banish-
ment of the arts from the realm of cognition, both erkenntnis and erleb-
nis are represented here as forms of knowledge. 
I. Cognitive Aspects of Dance: Performances 
The mental processes that dancers undergo during a performance will 
be considered primarily with respect to erlebnis. First it is necessary to 
consider ways to approach the inner experiences of the performers. 
Analyzing dance performances is one approach. This has been 
attempted in conjunction with the development of systems of notation 
for analyzing dance. Rudolf Laban's theory of dance notation, and also 
Godman's discussions of the symbolic nature of dance, are based on 
structural analysis of dance performances. Another approach is to apply 
concepts from the existing studies of psychomotor behavior and body 
movement to the examination of dance performances.s Such approaches 
omit consideration of factors such as intentions, feelings, and the role 
of the mind in correlating actions of muscle-tendon-joints, style, and 
feelings. A third approach is to question performers directly about their 
experiences. All three approaches were considered for this presentation. 
Of particular interest were interviews with two ballet dancers and two 
modern dancers who were asked to describe their own experiences of 
performing.7 
A dance performance occurs within an established system of move-
ment with its own rules and conventions for creating dances. Ballet, 
modern dance, and post-modern dance represent three different genres, 
21 
each with many stylistic variations. In order to participate, the performer 
must undergo training or initiation into a system of movement. Once the 
system is internalized, the performer is able to join with a choreographer 
and other dancers in its creative uses. Together, dancers and chore-
ographers produce individual dances that are shared with the members 
of dance audiences, who must also acquire a certain literacy in dance 
appreciation in order to participate. Even improvisational dance oper-
ates with a set of conventions, for example open form, non- traditional 
spaces and rejection of tradition. 
The principal elements in a performance from the dancer's point of 
view are the movements and/or instructions prescribed in the chore-
ography. The dancer then draws upon his/her technical skills and ex-
pressive powers to execute the movements with the appropriate quali-
ties of shape, line, proportion, feeling or concept. A sense of movement 
style in accordance with the overall intent of the piece is also required. 
Kinesthetic intelligence appears to exercise a dominant role, espe-
cially in traditional dance performances. Kinesthetic intelligence is spa-
tial intelligence that developed through muscle action and memory. Psych-
ologists refer to kinesthetic intelligence as the sensory system which 
controls all bodily movement and orients the moving body in space.8 
Kinesthetic intelligence provides the dancer with an immediate aware-
ness of the position of the body in space. It also registers the character-
istics of movement in all of the different parts-muscles, joints, tendons -
throughout the entire body including rate, extent, and duration. Kines-
thetic intelligence is thus a key element in enabling the dancer to learn 
and execute in performances the movements of a dance. Like other 
aspects of human intelligence, it is a flexible capacity adaptable to any 
number of different systems for creating dances. Classical ballet is but 
one of these. 
The human mind has a central role in the execution of a dance per-
formance. Mind is the controlling force which coordinates all of the vari-
ous sources a dancer draws upon to create a performance. These 
sources include kinesthetic, feelings and ideas, as well as prior training, 
choreography, and a sense of style. Mind thus harmonizes rhythmic 
spatial qualities of movement with expressive qualities and abstract 
ideas to create a sense of unity and order in a performance. A ballet 
dancer has described the role of the mind in a performance with these 
words: 
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The mind is the controlling center. It enables us to be in command 
of our bodies, to be concentrated, to bring clarity, and to acquire 
the right feeling that the movement needs.9 
The knowledge that a dancer receives through performing a dance 
may include a vivid, individualized awareness of sequences of the work 
from beginning to end, as well as a grasp of its overall shape. The aims 
for the work as established by the choreographer are internalized and 
given shape in the mind and body of the dancer and individuated within 
the dancer's own artistic persona. The choreographer's aims guide the 
dancer's efforts to realize the dance in the performance. The mental 
activity of the dancer includes an awareness of abstract relations of 
space and time, of scale and proportion, as well as concrete awareness 
of the movement phrases and body shapes in one part of the dance 
connecting to those in another part. Accompanying these experiences is 
a heightened awareness of relationships between various parts of the 
moving body. Occasionally, a dancer discovers new relationships 
between movements in various parts of the body while performing a 
dance. The cognitive experience that a dancer undergoes while produ-
cing a dance might be called "thinking in movement." It is somewhat 
analogous to thinking in painting or in music. Following Merleau-Ponty 
and others, it can be said that the mental processes that a performer 
undergoes involves no separation of thinking and doing. The dancer's 
movements become the very presence of thought. Using improvisa-
tional dance as a model, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has remarked, 
To be thinking in movement means that a particular situation is 
unfolding as it is being created by a mindful body; a kinesthetic 
intelligence is forging its way in the world, shaping and being 
shaped by the developing pattern surrounding it. 1o 
While I do not share Sheets' view that improvisational dancing is 
entirely independent of a symbol system, or that such dancing is essen-
tially free from prior thoughts experienced independently of the moment 
of creation, Sheets-Johnstone's description of "thinking in movement" in 
improvisational dancing corresponds very nicely to the notion of erleb-
nis described here. Her description suggests that dance performances 
provide individualized, yet orderly knowledge be obtainable solely in the 
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presence of improvisational dance works. However, other types of 
dance including classical ballet, and modern dance (for example Martha 
Graham) also provide experiences of er/ebnis prior to thought or feeling 
of movement. 
Perhaps this explanation of erlebnis aspects of dance performances 
can be strengthened by reference to a photograph. The photograph is 
Barbara Morgan's portrayal of Martha Graham in Lamentation, 1935. 11 
From the spectator's angle, the photograph expresses grief or anguish. 
These particular qualities are exemplified by means of sharp lines and 
angular body shapes, and by the contrasting of dark and light areas of 
the picture. Rhythmic movements, suggesting kinesthetic action, are 
accented by parallel diagonal lines of a sack dress stretched across the 
dancer's body and by the upward thrust of the dancer's head, out-
stretched arms, and knees. Metaphorically speaking, the photograph 
portrays in its parallel visual form the kinesthetic and expressive features 
of the dancer's experience during a performance. 
This brief overview suggests the conclusion that performing a dance 
represents a complex set of cognitive operations requiring attention to 
several different domains. Erlebnis requires that we consider kinesthetic 
processes, feelings, and ideals, all in relation to movement. While erleb-
nis appears to be the primary feature of knowledge considered from the 
point of view of the performer, a performance can also function to repre-
sent ideas and feelings to others. Hence, when dance movements tell 
an edifying story, or imitate the movements of the planets, for example, 
the dance approaches erkenntnis. But this does not seem to be its pri-
mary function. And erkenntnis is not the primary concern of the dancer. 
Because the producer in a performance is also the receiver of the know-
ledge given in the performance, he/she is in a unique position with 
respect to knowledge. As the producer, the dancer experiences the dis-
coveries that unfold during the creative process; as the receiver, he/she 
also shares with the audience the outcome of the performance through 
reflecting on it. Hence, the dancer experiences the performance at the 
levels of both erlebnis and erkenntnis. 
II. Responses to Performance 
While a dancer's knowledge may include what has been discovered 
during the creative process and also the results, there are apparent dif-
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ferences between the knowledge experienced directly by the producer 
and knowledge as it appears in criticism and aesthetic theory. The 
critic's and the aesthetician's knowledge, for example, does not depend 
entirely upon the actual presence of the work. Criticism and aesthetics 
can be written and read without one's being simultaneously in the im-
mediate presence of the performance, whereas the knowledge that the 
performer has is available only in the actual dancing. It is thus necessary 
to elaborate upon the characteristics of knowledge as it appears in criti-
cism and aesthetic theory in the text that follows. 
An expanded version of this section of my paper might include first 
hand responses of spectators to performances, as well as responses of 
critics, dance historians, art theorists, and philosophers. Here it is only 
possible to argue briefly that all such responses to a performance 
extend the cognitive significance of performances. All of these "sec-
ondary" responses to dance mainly consist of forms of erkenntnis or 
knowledge about the work. The spectator's first hand experience is per-
haps the most heavily imbued with erlebnis, but he/she brings theories 
and beliefs which are forms of erkenntnis. For example, a critic writes 
about unique ideas, movement shapes and patterns and expressive 
qualities found in a particular performance. The critic's experience too 
begins with erlebnis qualities of the dance work acquired from watching 
the dance. A dance historian, however, considers an individual dance 
work in relation to its historic and cultural contexts, and not always with 
the benefit of direct observation of performance. On a more abstract 
level, aesthetic theory offers a philosophical framework for discussing 
the framework of dance, and seeks to improve our thinking about the 
dance as one among other art media. 
A. Criticism 
In contract to performance, criticism occurs in the medium of a verbal 
language within the limits of its own more or less individual and institution-
alized practices. An overall aim of criticism is to improve our knowledge of 
performances. A performance acts as a stimulus pattern for a critic and 
provides a complex visual image for the critic's responses. Criticism itself 
consists primarily of descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations of per-
formances. Critics may also write about other aspects of dance including 
characteristics of a performer's style, more general discussions of a 
dance company, and the overall scope of a choreographer's work. 
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Of what does the critic's description of a performance consist? It is 
based on the impressions received as the performance presents itself to 
the senses, how it looks and feels. Some, but not all, of the properties 
that appear in a critic's description are available to direct observation. 
For example, the shapes and the movement of a physical body in 
motion, including the properties of speed, duration, and intensity, are 
readily observable. The types of costumes, lighting, set design, and the 
music, as well as the patterns of movement, are similarly observable. 
Kinesthetic and expressive qualities, and the ideas, all of which give 
artistic significance to physical movement, however, are registered in 
the mind and body of the critic without being susceptible to direct obser-
vation the usual sense of visual or auditory confirmation. These qualities 
are nonetheless essential to the description of the performance as a 
work of art. Other more complex qualities emerge from the simultaneous 
presence of the kinesthetic, expressive, and formal properties interact-
ing to create an overall sense of style in the performance. A critic's 
description of a performance, therefore, records the holistic, emergent 
properties that define the work as a whole, as well as the qualities of its 
separate parts. Sensitive observation skills and creative uses of lan-
guage are required to present these more intangible aspects of a perfor-
mance. 
Interpretation and evaluation, unlike description, call upon the critic 
to develop his own thoughts in response to the performance. Interpret-
ation allows the critic to say, in general, what the piece was about and to 
give suggestion as to its overall meaning. Frequently, interpretation will 
relate the happenings in a performance to a framework of ideas or 
beliefs existing outside the piece. A critic might, for instance, refer the 
viewers of Doris Humphries' "The Shakers" to the beliefs and practices 
of the nineteenth century Biblical religious group known as Shakers. A 
critic's interpretation of a new work might also analyze the work in the 
light of its artistic innovations and their significance for the art form. 
Evaluations of dance performances require critical judgment against 
a background of presumed expertise. Placing a value on the per-
formance, for instance, covers many factors including the skill of the 
performers, originality, liveliness or dullness of the performance, 
authenticity of performance style, overall contribution to the art, social 
relevance, as well as the critic's taste. Critical evaluations of per-
formances, in the best sense, arise out of and are supported by them. 
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Their value depends upon the perceptual and interpretive skills of the 
critic. 
All three aspects of criticism have been challenged at one time or 
another, when judged by criteria of cognitive significance established for 
knowledge in the sciences. Normally, as Joseph Margolis has pOinted 
out, description implies a stable, well defined object available for inspec-
tion, when there is a need to check the facts of any description of the 
work.12 A performance does not entirely satisfy these requirements of 
object stability and availability, because it exists in the full sense only as 
it is happening. It is possible to check on any disputed parts of a 
description, however, by consulting the performer and choreographer, 
and by consulting others who witnessed the performance. The existence 
of a notation for the performed work offers some hope, but there is not 
assurance that the notation contains all of the essential parts of the per-
formance, or that the notation was in fact executed precisely according 
to the written form. Video and film recording of the performance offers 
additional means of confirming a critical description, but none of these 
means can capture all of the nuances of performance. 
Recently, critics and philosophers of the dance have worried over 
possible discrepancies in a dance work from performance to perform-
ance, and about how discrepancies might affect the problem of knowing 
a dance. Such discrepancies are indeed a problem for those who insist 
on treating dance works and their performances as logically discrete 
symbols whose identity is violated by differences among their various 
instantiations in different performances. This is especially so in the case 
or works such as "Swan Lake" with long performance histories resulting 
in many changes in the choreography. The possibility of changes from 
one performance to another must be accepted as a "fact of life" which 
must be taken into account in comparing descriptions of dance perform-
ances, as well as for performances of dramatic works and music. Hence, 
it might not be possible in every case to check all of the details of one 
performance against another. This situation does not do any particular 
violence to the cognitive significance of critical descriptions. It simply 
points up the well-known fact that art works, including performances, 
are particular, rather than universal entities, which are appreciated for 
their uniqueness as well as for any common elements. 
Interpretations and evaluations of performances also do not fit well 
the cognitive models of empirical science. Interpretations may vary, and 
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evaluations are based on "subjective" judgments. Do these consider-
ations rule out criticism as a form of knowledge? Interpretations can be 
checked against the descriptive facts of a performance, and both critics 
and their readers are in a position to do this, within the limits noted 
above. It is sometimes possible, moreover, to have more than one 
acceptable interpretation of a performance without requiring agreement 
between the interpretations. Interpretations need not be judged true or 
false in order to have cognitive significance. They can be interesting, 
plausible, likely and still retain their cognitive significance.13 
Similarly, the evaluations of a work, though "subjective," also retain 
their cognitive significance. They are made against a background of 
expertise consisting of knowledge in the history and practice of the art, 
and by a trained observer whose perceptive skills are highly developed 
by regular practice as a critic. And they are supported by description 
and interpretation. While critical evaluations cannot be said to be true or 
false in any simplistic sense, they do advance our knowledge by inviting 
us to look more closely and to reflect for ourselves on the significance of 
a work. Frequently, the critic's suggestions lead us to explore on a 
deeper level our own initial reactions, thereby adding to the factual and 
interpretive content, or inviting a reappraisal of an initial response. The 
process of searching and inspection necessary to arrive at such judg-
ments is itself, the essence of cognitive activity.14 In all of these activities, 
descriptions, interpretation, and evaluation, criticism expands our know-
ledge about the dance work. There are nonetheless, limits to the kind of 
knowledge available in criticism. No one critical account, or the sum of 
such accounts, is likely to capture fully the qualities or the meaning of an 
art work whose very enigmatic complexity and richness imply an open-
ness to future description, interpretation, and evaluation. The result of 
this inquiry into criticism suggests that, indeed, criticism can contribute 
to our knowledge of a performance. It provides a record of fact and 
opinion against which to gauge our own understanding of performance. 
Yet not all of the important aspects of a performance can be set down 
in the language of erkenntnis of which criticism is one form. It cannot 
show us the intimate details of the dance as the performer knows it is his 
own body-mind processes, or as the spectator perceives it in the pres-
ence - as a flow of articulated movement in time and space. For an 
account of these aspects, we must refer to erlebnis, or knowledge 
gained directly from the work itself. 
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B. Aesthetics 
Aesthetics or theory of the arts, which in this case, refers primarily to the 
philosophical response to the arts, is also a form of erkenntnis. It pro-
vides the concepts and principles necessary for identifying art works 
and determining their constituent properties. A theory of dance thus pro-
vides a conceptual framework for identifying and appreciating perform-
ances, as well as for the development of criticism. Aesthetic theory also 
acts to improve our thinking about art works by providing a tradition of 
critical analysis which enables us to examine and improve upon the 
formulation of existing concepts and principles, and to introduce new 
theories when the developments in art call for changes in existing ones. 
Aesthetics differs from criticism in its origin. It is not ordinarily a direct 
response to a particular work. Rather, aesthetics is a response to perform-
ance recognized as an important entity within the domain of art whose 
existence calls for serious reflection. Aesthetic theory is formulated in 
abstract language and is lacking in the sensuous immediacy character-
istic of direct knowledge of a performance. It is also more abstract in its 
language than in criticism. 
What then is the relation of aesthetics to the cognitive significance of 
performances? In a certain sense, aesthetics supplies the conceptual 
foundation for any cognitive significance that a performance might have. 
Before a choreographer sets out to rate a dance, he must have some 
idea of what a dance would be. Similarly, a dancer does not perform the 
dance apart from some prior notion of the nature of performing. Without 
such knowledge, the dancer would not know where to begin or end, and 
would have no idea when he had succeeded or failed. Correspondingly, 
the spectators would not know when a performance is taking place, and 
when it is successful, without some implicit or explicit understanding of 
the underlying concepts and principles that establish the nature and 
objectives of performing. The theory may be implicit or explicit, but it 
must exist in some form if the activity of performance is to be recognized 
as a significant activity, one with purpose and meaning. 
By this discussion I do not mean to say that the dancers, choreog-
raphers, and spectators necessarily think in terms of abstract concepts 
and principles in the same sense as the philosophers. Aesthetic theory, 
as a specialized discipline, a:rticulates in its own language the concepts 
and principles that may be only implicit or informally present in the 
minds of the practitioners and observers of dance. It is necessary, there-
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fore, for those who can, that is, those whose interests and experience 
encompass an understanding of aesthetic theory and the practice of 
dance, to bring together the theory and the practice so that the theory 
may reflect a genuine knowledge of dance. It is equally important, when-
ever possible, that theory be applied to enrich and clarify the thinking of 
dance producers and spectators alike. 
There is, however, no one theory which covers all of the different pur-
poses that performances might serve, or the means of accomplishing 
such purposes. Ideas and expectations about the nature and purpose of 
dance have changed in the minds of practitioners and spectators from 
the time of the ancient Greeks to the present, and so have the theories of 
dance changed. From the time of Plato and Aristotle to the mid-
nineteenth century, the dominant theory governing the practice of 
theatre dance was the imitative theory. According to this theory, a dance 
performance consisted of rhythmic movements existing for the purpose 
of imitating the feelings and character of human nature, or of imitating 
aspects of the social order and cosmic movements of the stars and 
planets. Later, it was decided that dancing itself was sufficiently interest-
ing to be valued for its own intrinsic qualities of movement such as 
grace, and that it need not imitate anything. Toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, the expression theory, with its emphasis on the dynamic 
and feeling properties of dance, introduced yet another change in aes-
thetic theory with a corresponding shift in thinking about the important 
properties of a dance performance. As a result, attention was shifted 
from formal to expressive properties of the dance. 
Today it is possible to choose from any number of competing aes-
thetic theories, old and new. Among the more prominent views presently 
available on the nature of art works are the following: perceptual theories 
(Arnheim and Beardsley);15 symbol theories (Langer and Goodman);16 
and institutional-cultural theories (Danto and Margolis)Y Arnheim con-
tends, for example, that the most important features of a performance 
are the dynamic -expressive properties that define the structure of the 
dance, rendering it intelligible and meaningful to human beings. Beards-
ley, who also believes that an artwork is a perceptual object, directs our 
attention to aesthetic properties, which he holds are a function of formal 
unity and regional qualities of the performance. According to Beardsley, 
aesthetic properties are objectively present in performance, and avail-
able to a spectator by means of perceptual discrimination. In the trad-
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ition of Plato and Aristotle, Langer and Goodman argue that a perform-
ance functions as a kind of symbol. Both Langer and Goodman intro-
duce new distinctions among symbolic functions to try to accommodate 
the differences between symbols operating in a language and those 
common to particular art forms. Goodman, for example, might approach 
the performance looking for instances of representation, exemplification, 
or expression as a way of outlining the cognitive significance of a par-
ticular performance. 18 Danto would draw attention to the fact that to 
know the performance as a work of art requires something more that the 
eye alone can supply; it requires a theory of art that informs the viewer of 
the conditions under which an object may be considered a work of art. 
Margolis argues, however, that art works are intentional, culturally 
emergent objects embedded in a physical medium. According to his 
theory, a work of art can be known only in relation to the artistic and 
appreciative traditions of a particular culture. 
It is interesting to note that all of the aesthetic theories referred to 
here draw attention in some way to the cognitive aspects of perform-
ance. Symbolic theories point to the different types of cognitive func-
tions that a performance might serve, for example, representation, 
exemplification, and expression, while perceptual theories draw atten-
tion of the kinds of cognitive qualities, for example expressive or formal, 
that one might expect to encounter in a performance. The institutional 
and cultural theories each attempt to specify the conditions of knowing a 
performance as a work of art. Each of these theories, in some sense, 
directly or indirectly, gives access to knowledge about the performance. 
They tell us what to look for and give criteria for determining when an 
event is or is not a performance. 
Conclusion 
From the distinction drawn here between erlebnis and erkenntnis, it fol-
lows that human potential for learning through the arts encompasses at 
least two important aspects. Erlebnis pOints to knowledge accessible 
directly through participation in the artistic activities such as dancing, 
and to directly perceivable information that is communicated in the 
presence of art products such as a dance performance. Knowledge in 
such instances is transmitted in the formally ordered patterns of a 
system of dance movements that includes kinesthetic and expressive 
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features as well as abstract time and space configurations. Knowing a 
work in the sense of erlebnis is akin to knowing an object in nature 
directly through the senses, as opposed to knowing the object through 
the words that label or describe it. Erlebnis, as it occurs independently of 
erkenntnis, because a performer's and a spectator's knowledge are 
normally informed by prior knowledge about dancing. For the performer, 
this includes knowledge gained through prior training and experience of 
dancing. For the spectator it includes previous experiences of doing, 
observing, or reading about dance. 
Responses to art, including criticism, art histories, and aesthetic the-
ory, are represented here as essentially a form of erkenntnis. They pro-
vide a broader context of understanding the particular art work that is 
the focus in the discussion of erlebnis. These responses help us to see 
more clearly the structural and stylistic aspects of art works and bring 
forth their larger significance. The responses in the form of criticism, his-
tory, and theory, sometimes help to link the process of making and 
appreciating art works to other aspects of knowledge including the sci-
ences and the humanities. A critic might point out, for example, the theo-
ries of physical and optical space that are assumed in the presentation 
of ballet on a procenium stage. Or he might pOint out a relation of dance 
to the humanities with a discussion of a particular type of dancing and 
with reference to a concurrent philosophical theme. 
Finally, this analysis affirms the importance of including aesthetic 
education the primary art-making experiences such as performance, 
and also the response, including criticism, history of the arts, and aes-
thetic theory. Performance and responses to performances are not sep-
arate realms of knowledge any more than are erlebnis and erkenntnis; 
rather, they are complementary to each other and necessary to a com-
prehensive program in aesthetic education.19 
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